

rudimentary form of explosive is the mixture of urea and diesel. It is rather essential to highlight that most of the Naxal-placed landmines discovered weigh in tonnes and not kilos. Reportedly, Naxals have planted IEDs and mines in forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal to inflict greater casualties to security personnel undertaking operations in the area. Even National Highways in the worst affected districts have been mined by the Maoists. The government intends to include army personnel to detect the bombs, as the paramilitary forces have limited experience in such operations.

Although the Indian government persists to intensify its operations against the Naxals, it continues to maintain a slipshod attitude towards the issue of IEDs. The government has failed to legislate the Draft Ammonium Nitrate Rule, 2009, which was drafted to regulate the accessibility and supply of ammonium nitrate in India. The step was undertaken after the assertion that ammonium nitrate (used as fertiliser) was the main material used by Naxals in their IEDs. According to the Draft Rules, a consignment of ammonium nitrate passing through sensitive areas should be escorted by armed police personnel and the vehicle should be equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS).

Counter-measures

Naxals seem to be relentlessly evolving their IEDs, seemingly inspired from the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike the Indian police or paramilitary forces, Naxals are not restricted by legalities and therefore can adapt faster to the changing scenarios and nature of warfare. The need of the hour is to arm the security forces with the latest technology and equipment needed to undertake Counter Insurgency Operations. As evident in J and K and north-east, Road Opening Parties (ROPs) have proved to be effective in neutralising the area before the security forces embark on operations, therefore reducing casualties. Prudently, ROPs should be conducted in Naxal infested areas before security personnel advance for operations. The army can train the security forces with a solid training programme in order to acquaint them with counter-IED technology.

Procuring equipment would be futile if not coupled with appropriate training.

It is imperative for the security forces operating in Maoist-infested areas to revamp their strategy and tactics to counter the landmines. More emphasis should be laid on movement by foot, rather than using vehicles in mine infested *kuchha* roads. This would render the massive landmines sometimes weighing in tonnes, ineffective. Simultaneously, a better network of intelligence gathering should enable security forces to clamp down on IED manufacturing units in forests and villages. The cadres having expertise in bomb making should be identified and targeted. Effective area domination and improvements in road opening procedures inculcated from the army, would help in detecting mines on highways and other metalled roads prior to vehicle movements. Another way of limiting the menace of IEDs would be to restrict the easy availability of industrial explosives from reaching the Maoists. As earlier brought out, enabling trucks carrying explosive materials with GPS and better security at their storage areas, identifying agents who siphon off explosives to the Maoists would help in this regard.

Most IED attacks turn out successful because paramilitary personnel tend to step on the bombs / landmines. In order to act swiftly and safely, the security forces require Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles. Additionally, electronic jamming systems can prove effective as a countermeasure to the IED menace. The system can be placed on the vehicles operating in the Red Corridor. This system would block the signals of radio guided initiators, like cell phones, long-range cordless sets. Another countermeasure can be to propose procurement of the PING (a Pentagon-developed microwave project) from the US administration, which successfully locate insurgent weapons. Further, the government can also employ Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), which is equipped with a mechanical arm to inspect and relocate suspected IEDs.

Moreover, the global market offers an IED standoff detection system based on lightweight, mobile ground-penetrating radar which can be

installed on a vehicle. The system can detect metallic objects placed beneath the road-crust or at the roadside; these include mortar bombs or artillery shells rigged as IEDs. The radar has the ability to detect an IED / landmine from a distance of 300 ft, offering standoff safety and early warning for diffusion and neutralisation. Apart from these, the global market has numerous other weapon locating systems to order. It is important to point that the system of procurement is dominated by numerous procedures that remain both fruitless and ineffective. Rather than considering these procedures as gospel, the government needs to pull up its socks and equip the security forces with at least the basic equipment that ensure protection.

Control it now

The success of guerrilla operations greatly depends on IEDs, a threat that will continue to haunt India and the world at large. On June 10, 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that "countering the improvised explosive devices have become a high priority for NATO and that the United States has already begun to put training for IED detection high on its list." The statement mirrors the gravity of the IED menace and the seriousness with which it is being acknowledged in this era of turbulence. Undoubtedly, the sophistication of IEDs harming the US forces is more deadly as compared to the ones harming the Indian forces. For India, now is the right time to counter this threat before it transforms into an unmanageable threat like the Naxalites themselves. More than technology, a better grip on the area by the security forces possible only by an increase in the number of better trained and equipped personnel for anti-naxal operations who follow the correct road opening and movement drills in landmine infested belts of the Maoist hinterland will bring about a change in the situation.

A comprehensive and well crafted strategy to counter the lethal IEDs and landmines that combines better training and technology would bring down the number of security forces casualties suffered in left wing extremism considerably. 

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.